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Abstract:  We study optimal management of groundwater resources under risk of 
occurrence  of  undesirable  events.    The  analysis  is  carried  out  within  a  unified 
framework,  accommodating  various  types  of  events  that  differ  in  the  source  of 
uncertainty  regarding  their  occurrence  conditions  and  in  the  damage  they  inflict.  
Characterizing the optimal policy for each type, we find that the presence of event 
uncertainty  has  profound  effects.    In  some  cases  the  isolated  steady  states, 
characterizing the optimal exploitation policies of many renewable resource problems, 
become equilibrium intervals.  Other situations support isolated equilibria, but the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Overexploitation of groundwater resources—when pumping exceeds 
recharge—is pervasive worldwide (Postel, 1999).  Such a situation involves shrinking 
groundwater stocks, which may lead to one of the following outcomes:  i) The 
extraction cost increases to a point where it is no longer beneficial to pump above 
recharge and the aquifer settles at a steady state.  ii)  The groundwater stock is 
depleted, and from that time onward only the recharge can be pumped.  iii)  An event 
that adversely affects future exploitation benefits is triggered, e.g., seawater intrusion 
or the penetration of polluted water from nearby sources.  The theory of groundwater 
management under the first two scenarios is well developed (see Burt, 1964; Gisser 
and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp, 1983; and Tsur and Graham-Tomasi, 
1991, among many others), but the effects of the third type of outcome are not fully 
explored.  This paper undertakes to characterize optimal groundwater management 
under the threat of occurrence of adverse environmental events.   
An example in mind is the exploitation of a coastal aquifer.  Excessive 
extraction, over and above natural recharge, leads to a decline in the groundwater 
head, which, in turn, may result in seawater intrusion.  If seawater intrusion is a 
gradual process that can be monitored and controlled by adjusting extraction rates, the 
associated damage can be avoided.  Often, however, seawater intrusion occurs 
abruptly as soon as the fresh water head declines below some threshold level, 
inflicting a severe damage or rendering the aquifer useless for a long time.  In such 
cases, seawater intrusion can be treated as a discrete event.  When the threshold level 
that triggers the event is known with certainty, it is easy to avoid the damage by 
ensuring that the threshold level is never reached.  In most cases, however, the 
threshold is only partially known, due, e.g., to lacking information regarding   3
subsurface flows.  Moreover, the occurrence conditions may be affected also by 
stochastic environmental conditions that are not within the managers' control.  
Accounting for this kind of events, we enter the realm of event uncertainty.   
Impacts of event uncertainty on optimal exploitation policies have been 
studied in a variety of resource management problems, including pollution-induced 
events (Cropper, 1976, Clarke and Reed, 1994, Tsur and Zemel, 1996, 1998b), forest 
fires (Reed, 1984, Yin and Newman, 1996), species extinction (Reed, 1989, Tsur and 
Zemel, 1994), seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers (Tsur and Zemel, 1995), and 
political crises (Long, 1975, Tsur and Zemel, 1998a).  Typically, occurrence risk 
implies prudence, and the exploitation policies are more conservative than those 
obtained under certainty.  In some cases, however, event uncertainty encourages more 
vigorous extraction policies in order to derive maximal benefit prior to occurrence.  
Tsur and Zemel (1998b) trace these apparently conflicting results to differences in the 
occurrence conditions and the damage inflicted by the events and consequetnly 
classify events as reversible or irreversible, and endogenous or exogenous.   
In the context of groundwater, irreversible events are those that, once 
occurred, render the aquifer obsolete.  Reversible events, on the other hand, entail a 
heavy penalty (e.g. the cleaning cost of a polluted aquifer) but otherwise do not 
prevent further exploitation of the resource.  The adjective 'endogenous' signifies 
events whose occurrence is determined solely by the exploitation policy, although 
some essential information (e.g., the exact threshold level for seawater intrusion) is 
not a-priori known.  In contrast, exogenous events are triggered also by stochastic 
environmental conditions (the expansion of a nearby source of pollution), which are 
outside the managers' control.     4
It turns out that the distinction among the different types of event uncertainty 
bears profound consequences for optimal management policies and often alters 
properties that are considered standard.  For example, in a renewable resource context, 
the optimal stock process typically approaches an isolated equilibrium (steady) state.  
This feature, it turns out, no longer holds under endogenous event uncertainty:  The 
unique equilibrium state expands into an equilibrium interval and the eventual steady 
state depends on the initial stock.   
In this paper we present the problem of the optimal management of 
groundwater resources under event uncertainty in a unified framework that 
accommodates all the above-mentioned types of events.  We begin, in the next 
section, by characterizing the optimal extraction policy under certainty.  First we 
analyze the standard reference case of the nonevent problem, in which no event can 
ever interrupt the extraction plan, and then add certain events that occur when the 
groundwater stock shrinks to a known critical level.  Since we show that under these 
conditions it is never optimal to trigger the event, it follows that the optimal policy is 
insensitive to the nature of the event (reversible or irreversible) or to the amount of 
damage it inflicts.  This insensitivity, however, disappears when we deal (Section 3) 
with uncertain situations.  We show that under endogenous uncertainty the optimal 
policy is to drive the stock process to the nearest edge of an equilibrium interval.  The 
size of this equilibrium interval (which measures the degree of prudence implied by 
the events) turns out to depend on the expected damage from immediate occurrence.  
Under exogenous uncertainty, on the other hand, no extraction policy is perfectly safe 
and the equilibria are confined to isolated states.  The effect of exogenous uncertainty 
is measured by the shift of these equilibrium states (relative to the nonevent 
counterpart) and is sensitive to the hazard and penalty associated with the events.   5
2.  Groundwater management under certainty 
  We consider first the management of a confined groundwater basin (aquifer) 
under full certainty.  Let St denote the groundwater stock level at time t and R(St) the 
natural recharge rate (net water inflow excluding extraction), assumed decreasing and 
concave with  0 ) ( = S R  where S  is the aquifer's capacity.  Thus, recharge attains a 
maximal rate at an empty aquifer, diminishes with S at an increasing rate and vanishes 
when the aquifer is at a full capacity S .  With xt representing groundwater extraction, 
the aquifer's stock evolves with time according to   
t t t t x S R S dt dS − = ≡ ) ( / & .  (2.1) 
The benefit derived from consuming water at the rate x is Y(x), where Y is 
increasing and strictly concave with Y(0) = 0.  The cost of extracting at the rate x 
while the stock level is S is C(S)x, where the unit cost C(S) is nonincreasing and 
convex.  The instantaneous net benefit is then given by Y(x) − C(S)x.  It is assumed 
that  ) ( ) 0 ( S C Y > ′ , so that some extraction is worthwhile under the most favorable 
conditions. 
2.1. Nonevent:  When no event can interrupt groundwater extraction, the 
optimal plan is obtained by solving  
∫
∞ − − =
0 } { 0 ] ) ( ) ( [ max ) ( dt e x S C x Y S V
rt
t t t x
ne
t   (2.2) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0 and S0 given.  The optimal processes associated with the 
nonevent problem (2.2) will be indicated with an ne superscript.  This standard 
problem has been treated by a variety of optimization methods (see, e.g., Tsur and 
Graham-Tomasi, 1991; Tsur and Zemel, 1994, 1995) and we summarize the main 
findings below.     6
We note first that because problem (2.2) is autonomous, (time enters explicitly 
only through the discount factor), the optimal stock process 
ne
t S  evolves 
monotonically in time (Tsur and Zemel, 1994).  Since 
ne
t S  is bounded in  ] , 0 [ S  it 
must approach a steady state in this interval.  Using the variational method of Tsur 
and Zemel (2001), possible steady states are located by means of a simple function 
L(S) of the state variable, denoted the evolution function (see Appendix).  In 
particular, an internal state S ∈ (0,S ) can qualify as an optimal steady state only if it 
is a root of L, i.e L(S) = 0, while the corners 0 or S  can be optimal steady states only 
if L(0) ≤ 0 or  , 0 ) ( ≥ S L  respectively.  
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The properties of the functions Y, R and C imply that the term inside the curly 
brackets is decreasing while r − R'(S) > 0.  Moreover, the assumption that some 
exploitation is profitable at a full aquifer, i.e.,  Y
 ′(0) > C(S ), implies that 
0 )) 0 ( ) ( ))( ( ( ) ( < ′ − ′ − = Y S C S R r S L .  Thus, either L(0) ≥ 0, in which case L(S) has a 
unique root in [0,S ] or L(0) < 0.  Let S ˆ  represent the root of L(S) if L(0) ≥ 0 and 
S ˆ  = 0 otherwise .  We have, therefore established: 
Property 1:  S ˆ  is the unique steady state to which the optimal stock process 
ne
t S  
converges monotonically from any initial state.   
The vanishing of the evolution function at an internal steady state represents the 
tradeoffs associated with groundwater exploitation.  A steady state is optimal if any   7
diversion from it inflicts a loss.  Consider a variation on the steady state policy 
x =  ) ˆ (S R  in which extraction is increased during a short (infinitesimal) time period dt 
by a small (infinitesimal) rate dx above  ) ˆ (S R  and retains the recharge rate thereafter.  
This policy yields the additional benefit  . )) ˆ ( )) ˆ ( ( ( dxdt S C S R Y − ′   But it also decreases 
the groundwater stock by dS = −dxdt, which, in turn, increases the unit extraction cost 
by  dS S C ) ˆ ( '  and the extraction cost by  dS S C S R ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ′ .  The present value of this 
permanent flow of added cost is given by  )). ˆ ( /( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( S R r dS S C S R ′ − ′ 1  At the root of L, 
these marginal benefit and cost just balance, yielding an optimal equilibrium state.  
The state of depletion S = 0 can be a steady state also when L(0) < 0, or equivalently 
when  )] 0 ( ' /[ ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ' ) 0 ( )) 0 ( ( ' R r R C C R Y − − > − .  This is the case when the marginal 
benefit exceeds the added extraction cost even when the latter is at its maximum.   
While Property 1 implies that the stock process must approach S ˆ , the time to 
enter the steady state remains a free choice variable.  Using the conditions for an 
optimal entry time, we establish in the Appendix that the optimal extraction rate 
ne
t x  
smoothly approaches the steady state recharge rate  ) ˆ (S R and the approach of 
ne
t S  
towards the steady state S ˆ  is asymptotic, i.e.,  
Property 2:  Initiated away from S ˆ , the optimal stock process 
ne
t S  will not reach S ˆ  
at a finite time. 
Since problem (2.2) is autonomous, the optimal extraction can be expressed in 
terms of the state S alone.  Let x
ne(S) denote optimal extraction when the stock is S.  
The necessary conditions for optimum give rise to the following first order, nonlinear 
differential equation for x
ne(S) (see Appendix)   8
)] ( ) ( ))[ ( ( "
) ( ))] ( ( ' )) ( ( ' )][ ( ' [
) ( '
S x S R S x Y







= .  (2.4) 
with the boundary condition  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( S R S x
ne = , implied by the smooth transition to the 
steady state.  To allow the use of (2.4) as the basis for a numerical solution, one can 
remove the singularity at S ˆ  and obtain (see Appendix)  
2 )) ˆ ( ( "
) ˆ ( '
4




S R S x
ne − + + = ,  (2.5) 
which serves as the starting step for the integration scheme.   
Given x
ne(S), the optimal stock process 
ne






ne S x S R
dS
t
0 ) ( ) (
,  (2.6) 
and the value function is obtained from the Dynamic Programming equation (see, e.g., 
Kamien and Schwartz, 1981, p.242) 
)] ( )) ( ( ' )][ ( ) ( [ ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( S C S x Y S x S R S x S C S x Y S rV
ne ne ne ne ne − − + − =   (2.7) 




t S x x =  is also monotonous in time:  
Property 3:  
ne
t x  decreases with time while  S S
ne
t ˆ >  and increases with time when 
. ˆ S S
ne
t <  
Observe that the decrease in the extraction rate when the groundwater stock is 
above the steady state takes place even though the natural rate of recharge increases as 
the stock declines.  Thus, the two flow processes that drive the stock dynamics 
(extraction and recharge) work together to slow down the rate of approach to the 
eventual steady state.  
2.2. Irreversible Events:  Suppose now that driving the stock to some critical 
level Sc triggers the occurrence of some catastrophic event, e.g., the intrusion of saline   9
water into the reservoir, rendering the groundwater useless thereafter and ceasing 
extraction activities.  We refer to such occurrence as an irreversible event.  
Obviously, if  S Sc ˆ <  the event risk has no bearing on the optimal policy, because 
extraction falls short of the recharge rate for all  S S ˆ <  even without the event risk 
(Property 1), hence the critical level will never be approached.  We consider, 
therefore, the case  S S S c ˆ
0 > > . 
Let T denote the event occurrence time (T = ∞ if the stock never shrinks to Sc 
to trigger the event).  The certainty problem with irreversible event risk is formulated 
as  
, ] ) ( ) ( [ max ) (
0 } , { 0 ∫
− − =
T rt
t t t x T
ci dt e x S C x Y S V
t   (2.8) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0; ST = Sc and S0 > Sc given.  Problem (2.8) differs from the 
nonevent problem (2.2) by the additional decision variable T and the additional 
constraint ST = Sc.  Optimal processes corresponding to (2.8) are indicated with a ci 
superscript (c for certainty, i for irreversible).   
The event occurrence is evidently undesirable, since just above Sc it is 
preferable to extract at the recharge rate and enjoy the benefit flow associated with it 
rather than extract above recharge, trigger the event and lose all future benefits.  Thus, 
the event should be avoided:  
Property 4:  When the critical level Sc is known,  c
ci
t S S >  for all t and T = ∞. 
The certainty-irreversible event problem, thus, obtains the same form as the 
non-event problem (2.2), but with the additional constraint St > Sc.  The evolution 
function (2.3), therefore, applies to this problem as well, but only roots in the range 
[Sc,S ] (rather than [0,S ]) can be feasible steady states.  Being monotonous and   10
bounded, the optimal stock process 
ci
t S  must approach a steady state.  However, with 
S Sc ˆ >  the function L(S) is negative in the feasible interval  ] , [ S Sc , hence no internal 
steady state can be optimal.  The only remaining possibility is the critical level Sc, 
because the negative value of L(Sc) does not exclude this corner state.  We have, 
therefore, established  
Property 5:  When the critical level Sc corresponding to an irreversible event is 
known and lies above S ˆ , the optimal stock process 
ci
t S  converges monotonically to a 
steady state at Sc. 
According to this property, in the long run 
ci
t S  must lie above its nonevent 
counterpart 
ne
t S .  It turns out that this relation holds for the complete duration of the 
process, as stated in  




t S S >  for all t > 0. 
Both processes depart from the same initial stock S0 at t = 0.  According to 
Property 6, 
ci ne x x 0 0 >  and the policy under event risk is always more conservative, in 
the sense of leaving more water in the aquifer.  To see why, suppose that 
ci ne S S τ τ =  at 




t S S =  must hold during the entire time interval [0,τ] hence 
the extraction rates must also coincide during this period.  This, in turn, implies, (see 
(2.4)) that the two stock processes must evolve together also from τ  onwards, 
violating Properties 1 and 5.   
In fact, the extra caution due to the event risk is manifest also by the optimal 
extraction rates:  
Property 7:   ) ( ) ( S x S x
ne ci <  for any S > Sc.     11
The property follows directly from Property 6, when we consider the two 
optimization problems initiated at S0 = S.   
2.3. Reversible events: Assume now that the damage inflicted by the event can 
be cured at some cost.  For example, in some cases it may be possible to drive back 
the saline water by introducing large quantities of freshwater from other sources into 
the reservoir.  Under such circumstances we refer to the event as reversible and 
specify the post-event value as φ(Sc) = W(Sc) − ψ, where  
W(S) = [Y(R(S)) − C(S)R(S)]/r   (2.9) 
is the steady state value derived from keeping the extraction rate at the natural 
recharge rate R(S), and the penalty ψ > 0 is the (once and for all) curing cost.  The 
post-event value φ, thus, accounts both for the fact that the stock cannot be further 
decreased (to avoid a second occurrence) and for the curing cost. The aquifer 
management problem under reversible events is modified to   
) ( ] ) ( ) ( [ max ) (
0 } , { 0 T
rT T rt
t t t x T
cr S e dt e x S C x Y S V
t φ
− − + − = ∫   (2.10) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0; ST = Sc and S0 > Sc given.  Optimal processes associated 
with (2.10) are indicated with a cr superscript.  
Observe that (2.8) and (2.10) differ only in the post-event value.  It follows 
that an irreversible event is a special case of reversible events with a penalty that 
equals the steady state value W(Sc).  Not surprisingly, the optimal policies for the two 
types of event turn out to be the same.  To see this, note first that just as it is not 
desirable to trigger an irreversible event, it is also not desirable to do so with a 
reversible event because the post-event value is smaller than the steady state value 
that can be secured by avoiding the event occurrence:    12
Property 8:  When the critical level corresponding to a reversible event with any 
positive penalty is known, the optimal stock process  c
cr
t S S >  and T = ∞. 
Note that the reversible event may not be as harmful as the irreversible event 
(since the penalty may be smaller than W(Sc)).  Nonetheless, for both types of events, 
the penalty is never realized (Properties 4 and 8) and its exact value (so long as it is 
positive) is irrelevant.  It follows that the certainty policies do not depend on the 
nature of the event nor on the penalty it inflicts:  
Property 9:  When the critical stock level at which the event is triggered is known, 
the optimal policies under reversible and irreversible events are the same.  
The lack of sensitivity of the optimal policy to the details of the catastrophic 
event is evidently due to the ability to avoid the event occurrence altogether.  This 
may not be feasible (or optimal) when the critical stock level is not a-priory known.  
The optimal policy may, in this case, lead to unintentional occurrence, whose exact 
consequences must be accounted for in advance.  We turn, in the following section, to 
analyze the effect of uncertain catastrophic events on groundwater management 
policies. 
3.  Uncertain Events 
  Often the conditions that lead to the event occurrence are imperfectly known, 
or are subject to environmental uncertainty outside the planner's control.  In some 
cases the critical level is a priori unknown, to be revealed only by the event 
occurrence.  Alternatively, the event may be triggered at any time by external effects 
(such as subsurface flows of fresh and saline water) with a probability that depends on 
the current aquifer state.  We refer to the former type of uncertainty—that due to the 
planner's ignorance regarding the conditions that trigger the event—as endogenous   13
uncertainty (signifying that the event occurrence is solely due to the exploitation 
decisions) and to the latter as exogenous uncertainty.  It turns out that the optimal 
policies under the two types of uncertainty are quite different.  These policies are 
characterized below. 
3.1  Endogenous events:  We consider events that occur as soon as the 
groundwater stock reaches some critical level Sc, which is imperfectly known.  The 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence conditions, thus, is entirely due to the planner's 
ignorance concerning the critical level rather than to the influence of exogenous 
environmental effects.  Let  F(S) = Pr{Sc ≤ S} and  f(S) = dF/dS  be the probability 
distribution and the probability density associated with the critical level Sc.  The 
hazard function, measuring the conditional density of occurrence due to a small stock 
decrease given that the event has not occurred by the time the state S was reached, is 
defined by  
h(S) = f(S)/F(S).   (3.1) 
We assume that h(S) does not vanish in the relevant range, hence no state below the 
initial stock can be considered a-priori safe.   
The event occurrence time T is also uncertain, with a distribution that is 
induced by the distribution of Sc and depends on the extraction plan.  Upon 
occurrence, the penalty ψ is inflicted and a further decrease in stock is forbidden, 
leaving the post-event value φ(S) = W(S)−ψ.  For irreversible events, the post-event 
value φ vanishes.  Given that the event has not occurred by the initial time, i.e., that 
T > 0, we seek the extraction plan that maximizes the expected benefit  
{ } 0 ) ( ] ) ( ) ( [ ) (
0 } { 0 > + − = ∫




t t t T x
en
t φ   (3.2)   14
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0 and S0 given.  ET in (3.2) represents expectation with 
respect to the distribution of T.  Optimal processes corresponding to the endogenous 
uncertainty problem (3.2) are denoted by the superscript en.  
  As the stock process evolves in time, the managers' assessment of the 
distributions of Sc and T can be modified since at time t they know that Sc must lie 
below  }, { 0 τ τ S Min t ≤ ≤  for otherwise the event would have occurred at some time prior 
to t.  Thus, the expected benefit in the objective of (3.2) involves  }, { 0 τ τ S Min t ≤ ≤  i.e., 
the entire history up to time t, complicating the optimization task.  The evaluation of 
the expectation in (3.2) is simplified when the stock process evolves monotonically in 
time, since then  0 0 } { S S Min t = ≤ ≤ τ τ  if the process is nondecreasing (and no information 
relevant to the distribution of Sc is revealed) and  t t S S Min = ≤ ≤ } { 0 τ τ  if the process is 
nonincreasing (and all the relevant information is given by the current stock St).  It 
turns out that  
Property 10:   The optimal stock process 
en
t S  evolves monotonically with time.
2 
Property 10 allows to confine attention to monotonic processes.  Roughly speaking, 
the property is based on the idea that if the process reaches the same state at two 
different times, and no new information on the critical level is revealed during that 
period, then the planner faces the same optimization problem at both times.  This rules 
out the possibility of a local maximum for the process, because } { 0 τ τ S Min t ≤ ≤ remains 
constant around the maximum, yet the conflicting decisions to increase the stock 
(before the maximum) and decrease it (after the maximum) are taken at the same 
stock levels.  A local minimum can also be ruled out even though the decreasing 
process modifies  } { 0 τ τ S Min t ≤ ≤  and adds information on Sc.  However,  it cannot be 
optimal to decrease the stock under risk (before the minimum) and then increase it   15
(with safety, after the minimum) from the same state.  In fact, at any state along the 
optimal process, non-occurrence of the event cannot modify earlier decisions.  
Therefore, prior to occurrence no need ever arises to update the original plan, and the 
open- and closed-loop solutions are the same (see Tsur and Zemel, 1994, for a 
complete proof).   
For nondecreasing stock processes it is known with certainty that the event 
will never occur and the uncertainty problem (3.2) reduces to the nonevent problem 
(2.2).  When the stock process decreases, the distribution of T is obtained from the 
distribution of Sc as follows:  
1 − FT(t) ≡ Pr{T > t|T > 0} = Pr{Sc < St|Sc < S0} = F(St)/F(S0).  (3.3) 
The corresponding density and hazard-rate functions are also expressed in terms of 
the critical stock distribution: 
(a)    ) ( / )] ( )[ ( / ) ( ) ( 0 S F S R x S f dt t dF t f t t t T T − = = ,  
(b)    )] ( )[ (
) ( 1
) (
) ( t t t
T
T
T S R x S h
t F
t f




Let I(⋅) denote the indicator function that obtains the value one when its 
argument is true and zero otherwise, and observe that ET{I(T > t)|T > 0} = 1 − FT(t) = 
F(St)/F(S0).  Writing the objective of (3.2) as 
{ } 0 ) ( ) ( ] ) ( ) ( [
0 > + > −
− ∞ − ∫ T S e dt e t T I x S C x Y E T
rT rt
t t t T φ , the expectation for 
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) (
)} ( )] ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( { max ) ( dt e
S F
S F
S S R x S h x S C x Y S V
rt t
t t t t t t t x
aux
t φ   (3.5) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0;  S St ˆ ≥  and S0 given.  The allocation problem for which (3.5) is 
the objective is referred to as the auxiliary problem, and optimal processes 
corresponding to this problem are denoted by the superscript aux.  It turns out that the   16
auxiliary problem is relevant only for stock levels above S ˆ , hence S ˆ replaces the 
depletion level (S=0) as the lowest feasible stock for this problem.  In similarity with 
the previously defined problems, the optimal stock process associated with the 
auxiliary problem evolves monotonically with time.  Notice that at this stage it is not 
clear whether the uncertainty problem (3.2) reduces to the nonevent problem or to the 
auxiliary problem, since it is not a priori known whether 
en
t S  decreases with time.  
We shall return to this question soon after the optimal auxiliary processes are 
characterized. 
  Using (A.3), we obtain the evolution function corresponding to the auxiliary 
problem (3.5)  
L
aux(S) = [L(S) + h(S)rψ]F(S)/F(S0).  (3.6) 
In (3.6), L(S) is the evolution function for the nonevent problem, defined in (2.3), and 
h(S) is the hazard function, defined in (3.1).  Occurrence of the event inflicts an 
instantaneous penalty ψ (or equivalently, a permanent loss flow at the rate rψ) that 
could have been avoided by keeping the stock at the level S.  The second term in the 
square brackets of (3.6) gives the expected loss due to an infinitesimal decrease in 
stock.  Moreover, this term is positive at the lower bound  , ˆ S  while  0 ) ˆ ( = S L , hence 
0 ) ˆ ( > S L
aux , implying that S ˆ  cannot be an optimal equilibrium for the auxiliary 
problem.  Whether or not the auxiliary evolution function has a root in  ) , ˆ ( S S  (where 
L(S) < 0) depends on the size of the expected loss: for moderate losses, L
aux vanishes 
at some stock level 
aux S ˆ  in the interval  ) , ˆ ( S S , which is the optimal steady state for 
the auxiliary problem.  We assume that the root 
aux S ˆ  is unique
3.  Higher expected   17
losses ensure that L
aux > 0 throughout, and the auxiliary process converges to a steady 
state at the upper bound  . ˆ S S
aux =   It follows that 
Property 11:  
aux S ˆ  is the unique steady state to which the optimal stock process 
aux
t S  
converges monotonically from any initial state in  ]. , ˆ [ S S    
  Events for which φ(S) = W(S) − ψ = 0 are denoted irreversible.  Noting (2.9) 
and  0 ) ( = S R , we see that  0 ) ( = S W , while  0 ) ( < S L .  Thus, for irreversible events 
. 0 ) ( < S L
aux   It follows that the auxiliary evolution function must have a root in the 
interval  ), , ˆ ( S S  and the auxiliary equilibrium level for irreversible events must be an 
internal state. 
  We apply these results to characterize the optimal extraction plan for the 
endogenous uncertainty problem (3.2).  A detailed analysis is presented in Tsur and 
Zemel (1995).  Here we outline the main considerations: 
(i)  When  , ˆ
0 S S <  the optimal nonevent stock process 
ne
t S  increases in time.  
With event risk, it is possible to secure the nonevent value by applying the nonevent 
policy, since an endogenous event can occur only when the stock decreases.  The 
introduction of occurrence risk cannot increase the value function, hence 
en
t S  must 




t S S =  for all t, and increase monotonically towards the steady state  . ˆ S  
(ii)  When  , ˆ ˆ
0 S S S
aux > >  both 
ne
t S  and 
aux
t S  decrease in time.  If 
en
t S  is 
increasing, it must coincide with the nonevent process 
ne
t S , contradicting the 
decreasing trend of the latter.  A similar argument rules out a steady state policy.    18
Thus, 
en
t S  must decrease, coinciding with the auxiliary process 
aux
t S  and converging 
with it to the auxiliary steady state  . ˆaux S    
(iii)  When  , ˆ ˆ
0 S S S
aux ≥ ≥  the nonevent stock process 
ne
t S  decreases (or 
remains constant if  S S ˆ
0 = ) and the auxiliary stock process 
aux
t S  increases (or remains 
constant if 
aux S S ˆ
0 = ).  If 
en
t S  increases, it must coincide with 
ne
t S , and if it decreases 
it must coincide with 
aux
t S , leading to a contradiction in both cases.  The only 
remaining possibility is the steady state policy  0 S S
en
t =  at all t. 
  We summarize these considerations in   
Property 12:   (a)  
en
t S  increases at stock levels below  . ˆ S  
(b)  
en
t S  decreases at stock levels above  . ˆaux S  
(c) All stock levels in  ] ˆ , ˆ [
aux S S  are equilibrium states of 
en
t S . 
  The various possibilities are illustrated in Figure 1.  The equilibrium interval 
of Property 12(c) is unique to optimal stock processes under endogenous uncertainty.  
Its boundary points attract any process initiated outside the interval, (as indicated by 
the direction of the arrows in the Figure), while processes initiated within it must 
remain constant.  This feature is evidently related to the splitting of the endogenous 
uncertainty problem into two distinct optimization problems depending on the initial 
trend of the optimal stock process.  At  , ˆaux S  the expected loss due to occurrence 
(represented by the second term of (3.6)) is so large that entering the interval by 
reducing the stock cannot be optimal even if under certainty extracting above the 
recharge rate would yield a higher benefit.  Within the equilibrium interval, the 
planner can take advantage of the possibility to eliminate the occurrence risk 
altogether by not reducing the stock below its current level.  As we shall see below,   19
this possibility is not available under exogenous uncertainty, hence the corresponding 




Figure 1:  The evolution functions L(S) (Eq. 2.3) and L
aux(S) (Eq. 3.6) corresponding 
to the nonevent and auxiliary problems, respectively.  The arrows indicate the 
direction in which the optimal process 
en
t S  evolves.   ] ˆ , ˆ [
aux S S  is the equilibrium 
interval for this process. 
 
 
Endogenous uncertainty, then, implies more conservative extraction than the 
nonevent policy for any initial stock above  . ˆ S   Observe that the steady state 
aux S ˆ  of 
Property 12(b) is a planned equilibrium level.  In actual realizations, the process may 
be interrupted by the event at a higher stock level and the actual equilibrium level in 
such cases will be the occurrence state Sc.  The situation is depicted in Figure 2, in 
which the optimal stock processes corresponding to the nonevent and the endogenous 






S S ˆ aux S ˆ
























Figure 2:  A comparison between the optimal processes 
ne
t S  (corresponding to the 
nonevent problem) and
en
t S  (corresponding to endogenous uncertainty).  The latter 
process is interrupted by the event at time T and the rest of the process (depicted by 
the dashed-line process 
aux
t S ) is never realized. 
 
 
It is also noted that under endogenous uncertainty, reversible and irreversible 
events differ only in the precise location of the root of the auxiliary evolution 
function.  A large expected loss with  ) ( ) ( S L r S h − > ψ  excludes the possibility of a 
root in  ] , ˆ [ S S , hence the uncertainty process will never decrease; the expected loss in 
this case is too high to justify taking the risk of triggering the event at any stock level.  
For irreversible events such a situation cannot occur: since  , 0 ) ( = S W  the expected 
loss near S  is small and the auxiliary root must lie below this state. 
A feature similar to both the certainty and endogenous uncertainty processes is 
the (planned) smooth transition to the steady states.  When the initial stock is outside 
t  T 
en
t S  pre-event 
aux
t S   
ne





S0   21
the equilibrium interval, the condition for an optimal entry time to the steady state 
implies that extraction converges smoothly to the recharge rate and the planned steady 
state will not be entered at a finite time.  Thus, Property 8 extends also to endogenous 
uncertainty.  It follows that when the critical level actually lies below  , ˆaux S  
uncertainty will never be resolved and the planner will never know that the adopted 
policy of approaching 
aux S ˆ  is indeed safe.  Of course, in the less fortunate case in 
which the critical level lies above the steady state, the event will occur, resolving 
uncertainty at a finite time (see Figure 2).  
3.2  Exogenous events:  Random catastrophic events can be triggered by 
exogenous environmental conditions that are not within the resource managers' 
control.  The current groundwater stock level can affect the hazard of immediate 
occurrence, but whether the latter will actually take place is determined by stochastic 
exogenous conditions.  This type of event uncertainty was introduced by Cropper 
(1976) and analyzed by Clarke and Reed (1994) and by Tsur and Zemel (1998b) in 
the context of environmental pollution control.  Here we consider the implications of 
this kind of uncertainty on groundwater resource management.  Under exogenous 
uncertainty, the knowledge that a certain stock level has been reached in the past 
without triggering the event is not a safeguard from occurrence at the same stock level 
sometime in the future, lest the exogenous conditions turn out to be less favorable.  
Therefore, the mechanism that gives rise to the safe equilibrium intervals under 
endogenous uncertainty does not work here, and we shall show below that such 
intervals do not characterize the optimal processes under exogenous uncertainty.  
  As above, the post-event value is denoted by φ(S), which vanishes identically 
for all S under irreversible events.  The expected value from an extraction plan that 
can be interrupted by an event at time T is again given by the objective of (3.2), but   22
for exogenous events the probability distribution of T, F(t) = Pr{T≤t}, is defined in 
terms of a stock-dependent hazard rate h(St) = f(t)/[1−F(t)] as  
} ) ( exp{ 1 ) (
0 ∫ − − =
t
d S h t F τ τ .  (3.7) 
We assume that no stock level is completely safe, hence h does not vanish and the 
integral in (3.7) diverges for any feasible process as t→∞.  We further assume that 
h(S) is decreasing, i.e., filling the aquifer reduces the occurrence hazard.    
  Using (3.7) to evaluate the expected value derived from any feasible process 
we obtain the exogenous uncertainty problem:  
















+ − = ∫ ∫∫   (3.8) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0 and S0 given.  Unlike the auxiliary problem (3.5) for 
endogenous events, (3.8) provides the correct formulation for the exogenous 
uncertainty problem regardless of whether the stock process decreases or increases.   
To characterize the steady state, we need to specify the value W
ex(S) associated 
with the steady state policy x
ex = R(S).  Exogenous events may interrupt this policy, 
hence W
ex(S) differs from the value function W(S) of (2.5) obtained from the steady 
state policy under certainty or endogenous uncertainty.  An occurrence inflicts the 
penalty, but does not affect the hazard of future events.  The post-event policy, then, is 
to remain at the steady state and receive the post-event value W
ex(S) − ψ.  Under the 
steady state policy, (3.7) reduces to the exponential distribution F(t) = 1 − exp(−h(S)t), 
yielding the expected value W
ex(S) = W(S) − [W(S)−W
ex(S)+ψ]h(S)/[r+h(S)].  Solving 
for W
ex(S), we find  
W
ex(S) = W(S) − ψh(S)/r,  (3.9)   23
where the second term represents the expected loss over an infinite time horizon.  The 
explicit time dependence of the distribution F(t) of (3.7) does not allow to present the 
optimization problem (3.8) in an autonomous form.  Nevertheless, the argument for 
the monotonicity of the optimal stock process 
ex
t S  holds, and the associated evolution 
function can be derived (Tsur and Zemel, 1998b), yielding  
L
ex(S) = L(S) − d[ψ(S)h(S)]/dS.  (3.10) 
For reversible events with a fixed penalty and decreasing hazard one finds that 
L
ex(S) > L(S).  Since L(S) is positive below S ˆ , so must L
ex(S) be, precluding any 
steady state below S ˆ .  Thus, the root 
ex S ˆ  of L
ex(S) must lie above the nonevent 
equilibrium, implying  
Property 13:   The optimal stock process under exogenous uncertainty converges 
monotonically to the root 
ex S ˆ .  When the hazard-rate function h(S) is decreasing, 
S S
ex ˆ ˆ >  and the extraction policy is more conservative than its nonevent counterpart. 
  Property 13 is due to the second term of (3.10) which measures the marginal 
expected loss due to a decrease in stock.  The latter implies a higher occurrence risk, 
which in turn calls for a more prudent extraction policy.  Indeed, if the hazard is state- 
independent, the second term of (3.10) vanishes, implying that the evolution functions 
of the nonevent and exogenous uncertain event problems are the same and so are their 
steady states.  In this case, extraction activities have no effect on the expected loss 
hence the tradeoffs that determine the optimal equilibrium need not account for the 
penalty, no matter how large it may be.  For a decreasing hazard, however, the degree 
of prudence (measured by the shift  S S
ex ˆ ˆ −  in the equilibrium state) increases with ψ 
and the sensitivity to the penalty size is regained.   24
  For irreversible events, ψ = W
ex(S) and (3.9) implies that ψ = rW(S)/(r+h(S)), 
hence the second term of (3.10) becomes −[h(S)rW(S)/(r+h(S))]' which is usually of 
indefinite sign because W(S) can increase with S at low stock levels.  The case of a 
constant hazard, (h(S)=h>0) is of particular interest.  In this case, we use (2.3) and 
(2.9) to reduce (3.10) to  
 L
ex(S) = L(S) − W
 '(S)hr/(r+h) = {L(S) − h[Y
 '(R(S))−C(S)]}r/(r+h).  (3.11) 
It follows that the steady state cannot lie at or above S ˆ :  In this range, L(S) ≤ 0, 
implying that Y
 '(R(S))−C(S) ≥ −C
 '(S)R(S)/(r−R'(S)) > 0.  Thus, both terms in the curly 
brackets of (3.11) are negative and L
ex(S) < 0, excluding a steady state.  Therefore, 
S S
ex ˆ ˆ <  and the uncertainty policy is less conservative than its nonevent counterpart.  
Property 14:   When the hazard of irreversible exogenous events is constant, the 
optimal steady state 
ex S ˆ  lies below S ˆ , and uncertainty induces higher extraction 
rates. 
  The intuition behind Property 14 is clear: with a stock-independent hazard 
rate, the extraction policy does not affect the occurrence probability.  However, since 
the post-event value vanishes, the planners wish to accumulate as much benefit as 
possible prior to occurrence, speeding up the extraction activities and reducing the 
equilibrium stock.  In terms of (3.10), we see that the penalty ψ = W
ex(S) increases 
with the stock, hence reducing the latter is equivalent to reducing the expected loss, 
encouraging vigorous extraction.  Similar results have been derived by Clarke and 
Reed (1994) for catastrophic environmental pollution. 
  The results presented in this section highlight the sensitivity of the optimal 
uncertainty processes to the details of an interrupting event.  The type of uncertainty 
determines the equilibrium structure: endogenous uncertainty gives rise to equilibrium   25
intervals while exogenous uncertainty implies isolated equilibrium states.  In most 
cases, the expected loss due to occurrence encourages prudent extraction policies, but 
the opposite behavior is optimal under constant hazard of irreversible exogenous 
events.   
4.  Concluding comments 
 
While it is widely recognized that uncertainty may have profound effects on 
groundwater management, the precise manner in which the optimal extraction rules 
should be modified is often ambiguous.  In this work we concentrate on a particular 
type of uncertainty, namely event uncertainty, under which the occurrence date of 
some catastrophe cannot be predicted in advance.  The occurrence of the catastrophic 
event, which significantly reduces the value of the resource, might be advanced by the 
extraction activities.  Event uncertainty, therefore, renders intertemporal 
considerations particularly relevant to the design of optimal extraction rules:  Unlike 
other sources of uncertainty (time-varying costs and demand, stochastic recharge 
processes, etc.) under which the extraction policy can be updated along the process to 
respond to changing conditions, event uncertainty is resolved only by occurrence, 
when policy changes can no longer be useful.  Thus, the expected loss due to the 
catastrophic threats must be fully accounted for prior to occurrence, and the resulting 
policy rules are significantly modified.  
In this work we study optimal groundwater extraction under the threat of 
events that differ in the damage they inflict and the conditions that trigger occurrence.  
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the optimal management policy to the details of the 
hazard and damage specifications.  The analysis is presented here in the context of 
groundwater resources but has wide application in a variety of resource situations 
involving event uncertainty.   26
 
Appendix 
A1:  The evolution function 
Tsur and Zemel (2001) consider possible equilibrium states for general infinite 
horizon optimization problems of the form  
∫
∞ − =
0 } { 0 ) , ( max ) ( dt e x S B S V
rt
t t xt   (A.1) 
subject to  , , ), , ( x x x S S S x S g S t t t t ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ = &  S0 given, assuming that the steady 
state policy is feasible, i.e. there exists a "recharge" function  x S R x ≤ ≤ ) (  such that 
setting x = R(S) in g yields g(S,R(S)) = 0.  B in (A.1) is the benefit flow, and g 
determines the state dynamics, while some of the inequality constraints can be relaxed 
by assigning infinite values to the corresponding bounds.  The steady state policy 
x = R(S), then, yields the value  
W(S) = B(S,R(S))/r.  (A.2) 
 For the nonevent problem (2.2), (A.2) reduces to (2.9).  The optimality of the 
steady state policy for a given state S is tested by comparing W(S) with the value 
obtained from a slight variation on this policy.  It is established that an interior state S 
can be an optimal steady state only if it is a root (zero) of the evolution function, 











/ )) ( , (
/ )) ( , (
) ( S W
x S R S g
x S R S B
r S L .  (A.3) 
If L(S) does not vanish, a feasible variation on the steady state policy yielding a value 
larger than W(S) can be found, hence S is not an optimal steady state.  Corner states 
make an exception by the possibility to qualify as optimal steady states without being 
roots of  L(S), depending on the sign obtained by the evolution function at these states.    27
In particular, the lower bound S  can be an optimal steady state if  , 0 ) ( < S L  while the 
upper bound can be an optimal steady state if  . 0 ) ( > S L  
  Specializing (A.3) to the nonevent and auxiliary problems (2.2) and (3.5), we 
obtain the corresponding evolution functions (2.3) and (3.6). 
A2:  The dynamics of the nonevent processes 
  We assume below that the nonevent steady state S ˆ  is internal and suppress, 
for brevity, the superscript ne from the associated optimal processes.  Let T denote the 
time at which the optimal nonevent stock process St enters the steady state  . ˆ S   The 
nonevent problem (2.2) is recast in the form  
) ( ] ) ( ) ( [ max ) (
0 } , { 0 T
rT T rt
t t t x T
ne S W e dt e x S C x Y S V
t
− − + − = ∫   (A.4) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0;  S ST ˆ =  and S0  given.  Denoting the current-value 
costate variable by λt, we obtain the current-value Hamiltonian  
] ) ( [ ) ( ) ( ) , , ( x S R x S C x Y x S H − + − = λ λ .  (A.5) 
Necessary conditions for optimum include  
, 0 ) ( ) ( = − − ′ λ S C x Y   (A.6) 
and  
). ( ) ( / S R x S C S H r ′ − ′ = ∂ −∂ = − λ λ λ &   (A.7) 
The transversality condition associated with the free choice of the entry time T is  
, 0 ) ˆ ( ) , , ˆ ( = − S rW x S H T T λ  or, noting (A.6) and (2.9) 
), ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )) ˆ ( ( ] ) ˆ ( )][ ˆ ( ) ( [ ) ˆ ( ) ( S R S C S R Y x S R S C x Y x S C x Y T T T T − = − − ′ + −  giving   
)]. ˆ ( )[ ( )) ˆ ( ( ) ( S R x x Y S R Y x Y T T T − ′ = −   (A.8) 
Recalling the concavity of Y, (A.8) implies    28
) ˆ (S R xT = ,  (A.9) 
 hence the transition to the steady state extraction rate must be smooth. 
  Taking the time derivative of (A.6) we obtain  ]. ) ( )[ ( ) ( x S R S C x x Y − ′ − ′ ′ = & & λ   
Comparing with (A.7), we can eliminate the co-state variable and its time derivative  
). ( ))] ( ( ) ( )][ ( [
) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )][ ( [ ) (
S L S R Y x Y S R r
S R S C S C x Y S R r x x Y
− ′ − ′ ′ −
= ′ + − ′ ′ − = ′ ′ &
  (A.10) 
For an autonomous problem, the optimal extraction is a function of the state S 
alone, xt = x(St) hence  ]. ) ( )[ ( x S R S x x − ′ = &   Therefore, (A.10) reduces to a first order 
differential equation for x(S):  
)] ( ) ( ))[ ( ( "
) ( ))] ( ( ' )) ( ( ' )][ ( ' [
) ( '
S x S R S x Y




= .  (A.11) 
with the boundary condition  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( S R S x = , representing the smooth transition to the 
steady state established by (A.9).   When S ˆ  is internal, both numerator and 
denominator of (A.11) vanish at this state.  Nevertheless, the equation can be reduced, 
using l'Hopital's rule, to a quadratic equation in the difference ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( S R S x ′ − ′ , yielding 
(2.5) (see Tsur and Zemel, 1994). 
  Once the solution x(S) of (A.11) is given, (2.1) is readily integrated, yielding 
(2.6).  Since (2.5) ensures that the difference  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( S R S x ′ − ′  is finite, the singularity of 
(2.6) at the steady state implies that the integral diverges when its upper limit is set at 
, ˆ S  giving T = ∞ and establishing Property 2.   The derivation of Properties 4 and 8, 
corresponding to known critical stocks, is simpler: the transversality condition 
associated with the free choice of the entry time T,  , 0 ) ( ) , , ( = − c T T c S r x S H φ λ  is 
written in the form (c.f. the derivation of (A.8))  
, 0 )] ( )[ ( )) ( ( ) ( < − = − ′ − − ψ r S R x x Y S R Y x Y c T T c T   (A.12)   29
and the concavity of Y implies that (A.12) cannot be solved with xT ≥ R(Sc).  Thus, the 
transversality condition cannot be satisfied in finite time and the event is never 
triggered. 
  Consider now the decreasing function  J(S) = −C'(S)R(S)/[r−R'(S)].  From 
(A.7) we deduce that  . ) ˆ ( ∞ = λ S J   For finite times, we use (2.1) and write (A.7) as 
, ) ( )] ( )][ ( [ ) ( )] ( [ t t t t t t t t t t S S C S J S R r x S C S R r & & ′ − − ′ − = ′ + ′ − = λ λ λ  or  
)] ( )][ ( [ / )] ( [ t t t t t S J S R r dt S C d − ′ − = + λ λ .  (A.13) 
When the stock process St lies above  , ˆ S  it decreases, hence both C(St) and J(St) must 
increase.  Suppose that J(St) > λt.  According to (A.13), the process λt + C(St), hence 
λt itself, must decrease with time.  It follows that the difference J(St) − λt increases in 
time, violating the end condition  . ) ˆ ( ∞ = λ S J   Thus,  
 J(St) < λt     for all  . ˆ S St >   (A.14) 
According to (A.6),  λt + C(St) = Y'(xt) hence (A.13) and (A.14) imply that Y'(xt) 
increases and xt decreases with time whenever  . ˆ S St >   The same considerations show 
that xt increases with time when the stock process lies below  , ˆ S  establishing Property 
3.  In fact, the extraction and stock processes always show the same trend, hence the 
function  x(S) of (A.11) must increase. 
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1 The effective discount rate equals the market rate r minus the marginal recharge rate 
R′ because by reducing the stock by a marginal unit and depositing the proceeds at the 
bank the resource owner gains the market interest rate r plus the additional recharge 
rate −R′ (see Pindyck 1984).   
2 For degenerate problems that allow multiple optima, the property ensures that at 
least one optimal plan is monotonic. 
3 The case of multiple roots is discussed in Tsur and Zemel (2001).  The possibility of 
more than one root entails some ambiguity on the identification of the steady state but 
contributes no further insight. 